The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute
which the author adopts in this paper. First-order compliance is compliance with substantive rules, often stipulated in treaties. Second-order compliance refers to compliance with the authoritative decisions of a third party such as a treaty body or a dispute settlement body. The implementation of R&R is a typical example of a second-order compliance mechanism.
The main purpose of this research is to analyze the R&R implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of second-order compliance in international law. This paper is composed of four parts, including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will compare the WTO implementation system with the second-order compliance systems of various other organizations. Part three will explore the legal nature of WTO retaliation. It will be compared with countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. disputing parties, 13 it does not lay down any procedure to ensure the implementation of such judgments. In this respect, Article 94(2) of the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter the Charter) provides that: "If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." Thus, the Security Council has discretion to act to enforce the judgment of the Court. 14 However, recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2) has been taken only once, in the Nicaragua case. 15 On that occasion, a draft resolution introduced by some non-permanent members of the Security Council called for full and immediate compliance with the judgment, but the United States vetoed it. 16 To date, the Security Council has never passed any recommendation or decision on the execution of the ICJ's judgments. The implementation mechanism under Article 94(2) of the Charter has its limitations, especially in the cases where a respondent is a permanent member of the Security Council. Apart from judgments, the problems of Security Council enforcement of the Court's orders prescribing provisional measures can be seen in two cases. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the United Kingdom referred the matter to the Security Council and insisted that the Security Council was competent to implement the ICJ's order on a provisional measure in accordance with Article 94(2) of the Charter and Article 41 of the Statute. 17 The Security Council, however, adjourned the discussion of the problem until ICJ had delivered judgment on the issue of its jurisdiction. Because ICJ eventually decided that it had no jurisdiction over the case, the problem was never taken up in the Security Council. 18 In the Bosnia case, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to Article 94(2), also requested the Security Council to enforce an order of ICJ prescribing a provisional measure against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 19 The Security Council adopted a resolution in which it merely 20 As with the case of the ICJ judgments, the Security Council has never played an active role in enforcement of the ICJ orders concerning provisional measures. The ICJ's compliance system, the purpose of which is to ensure the implementation of the ICJ judgments or orders on provisional measures, is a secondorder compliance system similar to the WTO implementation scheme. However, there have been few instances where disputing parties have actually made recourse to the ICJ's compliance system, unlike the WTO equivalent. Furthermore, whether the ICJ's enforcement system works effectively depends on decision-making in the Security Council. In particular, the veto of the permanent members can be a serious obstacle to the effectiveness of the enforcement system. The process of the WTO implementation scheme, on the other hand, works automatically because DSB decides to establish compliance panels and authorizes retaliation by negativeconsensus. Namely, no member has a veto power over the DSB's decisions. Thus, there are substantial differences between the two systems. According to the procedure, when the Committee finds a violation of ICCPR and recommends remedies, it also requests that the State Party concerned report on the measures taken to comply with the recommendations within six months. If no reply is received within that period, or if the reply shows that no remedy has been provided, this will be noted in the Committee's annual report. 25 The Like the WTO implementation scheme, the follow-up mechanism for ICCPR is a second-order compliance system. However, the former has been consistently successful, whereas the Human Rights Committee has received unsatisfactory or even no response from State parties in many cases. 33 The latter mechanism is mainly based on the information gathering by the Special Rapporteur and voluntary 'dialogue' with the States parties concerned. There is no procedure for the Committee to adopt additional views on whether or not the State parties concerned have taken appropriate measures in response to the Committee's original views. This means that the follow-up mechanism has no process equivalent to the compliance panel procedure in WTO. In addition, no enforcement action will be taken in the event of state parties' non-compliance with the recommendations of the Committee. This is another difference from the WTO implementation mechanism, which prescribes a system of countermeasures in response to non-compliance with R&R.
B. The WTO Implementation System and Individual Complaints under Human Rights Treaties

C. The WTO Implementation System and the International Labor Organization Complaints Procedure
In order to ensure compliance with labor standards, the International Labor Organization ("ILO") has established a supervisory system consisting of both regular and ad hoc procedures. The regular procedure relies on mandatory periodic reports by member States to the International Labor Office. These reports concern the States' measures to implement provisions of the treaties that they have ratified. 34 The ad of employers or of workers that any of the Members has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance the latter is contained in Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, which provides that a complaint may be filed against a member State for non-compliance with a ratified Convention. Such a complaint may be filed by another member State which has ratified the same Convention, a delegate to the International Labor Conference, or the ILO's Governing Body in its own capacity.
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The ILO complaints procedure is similar to the WTO implementation system. In the ILO system, first, the Governing Body may appoint a Commission of Inquiry (hereinafter the Commission) to consider complaints. The Commission shall prepare a report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to determining the issue and containing recommendations as to the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and the time within which they should be taken. 37 Second,
any ILO Member concerned in the complaint may refer the complaint to ICJ if they reject the Commission's recommendations, and ICJ may affirm, vary or reverse any of the findings or recommendations of the Commission. 38 In the event of failure to implement the recommendations of the Commission or decision of ICJ, the Governing Body may recommend to the ILO's General Conference appropriate actions to secure compliance therewith. 39 Third, the defaulting government may at any time inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary to comply with the recommendations of the Commission or the decision of ICJ and may request that the Governing Body constitute a Commission of Inquiry to verify its contention. If the implementation of the recommendations or decision is confirmed, the Governing Body shall recommend the discontinuance of any action taken to secure compliance.
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The ILO complaints procedure resembles the compliance panel procedure in the WTO system because a Commission of Inquiry constituted for the purpose of verifying compliance considers whether the recommendations of the 'original' Commission of Inquiry have been implemented. Also, in cases of non-compliance with the Commission's recommendations or the ICJ's decision, the Governing Body within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the government against which it is made, and may invite that government to make such statement on the subject as it may think fit." 36 ILO Constitution art. 26, ¶ ¶ 1-4. For details, see c. ROmanO, the iLO system Of As indicated above, pursuant to Article 64, an investor's home State may submit a claim to ICJ when the host State refuses to enforce an ICSID award in its territory. However, as discussed above, the ICJ judgments themselves suffer from weak implementation mechanisms. Therefore, the ICSID enforcement system has its limitation because of its dependence on domestic procedures, though in the majority of investment disputes the parties voluntarily comply with arbitration awards.
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E. Evaluation
As shown in the comparisons above, the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure is unique. by the Security Council under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, this system has a structural weakness due to the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. Follow-up mechanisms for individual complaints in human rights treaties exist, but the enforcement measures available to the relevant Committees and Special Rapporteurs are limited. While the ILO's complaints procedure involves mechanisms similar to the WTO implementation system, they have not often been used to date. The ICSID mechanism for enforcement of its awards is dependent on the domestic legal systems of the Contracting States, unlike the implementation mechanism of WTO.
In general, the WTO dispute settlement system has a very good compliance record. 50 Since 1995, compliance panel reports have been issued in 25 cases. Among these, the disputes were settled in 20 cases (80%) as follows: in two cases, the compliance panels found that R&R was implemented by the respondents; 51 in nine cases, the disputing parties reached mutually satisfactory solutions; 52 in six cases, the respondents notified that they had implemented or intended to implement R&R; 56 This record shows that retaliation is not necessarily effective in all cases. Having said that, overall, the WTO implementation system is efficient in solving disputes, though it is not perfect. In comparison with other second-order compliance procedures, it can be said that the implementation system of WTO is a unique mechanism which is functioning effectively in practice.
III. Retaliation in WTO and Countermeasures in General International Law
In practice, the retaliation mechanism is an important part of the WTO DSB's R&R implementation system. Some commentators argue that retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system is equivalent to countermeasures in general international law. 57 In the following sections, the author will distinguish retaliation in the form of suspension of concessions and other obligations under DSU from the concept of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement. In this discussion, reference will be made to the concept of countermeasures in general international law. 
A. Countermeasures in General International Law
It is well-established that a State injured by another State's internationally wrongful act may take countermeasures against that State if certain requirements are met. 58 This is stipulated in the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility. 59 Countermeasures may only be taken by an injured State in order to induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations under Part Two of the ILC's Articles. 60 They are adopted to cease the internationally wrongful conduct and, if it is continuing, to provide reparation to the injured State. 61 Reparation takes the form of restitution, compensation, and/ or satisfaction. 62 Countermeasures must be temporary or provisional in nature.
This is because they should be discontinued once they are effective in inducing the responsible State to comply with its obligations of cessation and reparation. 63 Thus, countermeasures in general international law are one of the circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of conduct (i.e. the conduct constituting the countermeasures) that would otherwise not be in conformity with the international obligations of the State concerned; they are intended as an instrument for achieving compliance with the obligations of the responsible State under the secondary rules prescribing the consequences of the breach of primary rules.
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Proportionality is a well-established requirement for taking countermeasures. 65 Article 51 of the ILC's Articles provides that: "Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question." Although proportionality relates primarily to the injury suffered, the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question are also taken into account. This means that, in determining the proportionality of countermeasures, not only the 'quantitative' element (relating to injury) but also 'qualitative' factors are to be considered. Disproportionate measures are not necessary to induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations.
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Therefore, countermeasures in general international law are an enforcement mechanism in a decentralized system in accordance with the requirement of proportionality. If the respondent party objects to the level of suspension proposed, the matter is referred to arbitration (hereinafter Article 22.6 arbitration). 69 In this section, the author will analyze decisions arising from Article 22.6 arbitration in relation to the purposes of suspension under Article 22 and the meaning of the 'equivalence' requirement.
B. Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations under DSU
The Purposes
There have been seven cases of Article 22.6 arbitration to date. In the EC-Banana (US) case, the arbitrators stated as follows:
Accordingly, the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure pending full implementation by the Member concerned. We agree with the United States that this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance.
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The arbitrators clearly recognized that the purpose of the suspension of concessions and other obligations is to 'induce compliance.' This is indicated by the temporary nature of the suspension. Also, it is worth noting that the arbitrators described the suspension of concessions as 'countermeasures.' The arbitrators' views were accepted by the arbitrators in several later Article 22.6 arbitrations. compliance. The arbitrators in EC-Banana (Ecuador) explained that cross-retaliation may be necessary to induce compliance and make "the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system... function properly."
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In US-1916 Act, while the European Communities stressed that the basic purpose of the suspension of concessions is to induce compliance of another Member with their WTO obligations, the United States suggested other possible purposes, such as to restore the balance of benefits under the covered agreements between the parties to the dispute. 74 On this point, the arbitrators found:
In our view, a key objective of the suspension of concessions or obligationswhatever other purposes may exist -is to seek to induce compliance by the other WTO Member with its WTO obligations.
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In US-Offset Act, however, the arbitrators took slightly different views on the purpose of suspension of concessions. They stated:
However, it is not expressly referred to in any part of DSU and we are not persuaded that the object and purpose of DSU -or of the WTO Agreementwould support an approach where the purpose of suspension of concessions or other obligations pursuant to Article 22 would be exclusively to induce compliance.
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Although the arbitrators noted that inducing compliance may be only one of the purposes in authorizing the suspension of concessions or other obligations, they did not specify any other possible purposes. 77 In any event, the arbitrators found that "suspension of concessions or other obligations is intended to induce compliance, as has been acknowledged by previous arbitrators." 78 In US-Gambling, the arbitrators also mentioned that the purpose of suspension of concessions was to induce As the DSB's R&R require respondent parties to bring their measures into conformity with the WTO agreements, 'inducing compliance' equals to inducing implementation of R&R. This implementation involves respondent parties complying with the obligations under the WTO agreements in respect of the measures found by panels and/or the Appellate Body to be inconsistent with the covered agreements. The suspension of concessions under DSU is similar to countermeasures in general international law in the sense that both of them are intended to cease internationally wrongful acts. In fact, the arbitrators in EC-Banana (US) and US-Offset Act described suspension of concessions as 'countermeasures.'
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In the other cases, however, the arbitrators did not use the term 'countermeasures'; it is not clear whether the arbitrators considered that suspension of concessions corresponded to countermeasures in general international law.
The Equivalence Requirement
In relation to the equivalence requirement, the arbitrators in EC-Banana (US) noted that while Article XXIII:2 of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 1994 provided that the benchmark for authorization of the suspension of concessions was the standard of 'appropriateness,' Article 22 of DSU explicitly referred to a standard of 'equivalence.' On this issue, the arbitrators found as follows:
The ordinary meaning of "equivalent" implies a higher degree of correspondence, identity or stricter balance between the level of the proposed suspension and the level of nullification or impairment. Therefore, we conclude that the benchmark of equivalence reflects a stricter standard of review for Arbitrators acting pursuant to Article 22.7 of the WTO's DSU than the degree of scrutiny that the standard of appropriateness, as applied under GATT of 1947 would have suggested. 
The Purpose of Countermeasures under the SCM Agreement
In Brazil-Aircraft, the arbitrators referred to the Naulilaa arbitral award and the ILC's Articles when they interpreted the term 'countermeasures' in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. Noting that the ILC's Articles clarifies that countermeasures are meant to induce States to comply with their secondary obligations, they have concluded that a countermeasure under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement is appropriate if it effectively induces compliance, that is, the withdrawal of a prohibited subsidy. 89 The arbitrators in US-FSC also took the view that the authorization of countermeasures by DSB was aimed at inducing or securing compliance with the DSB's R&R in the form of withdrawal of the prohibited subsidies. 90 Referring to the ILC's Articles, they found as follows:
[Article 49.1 of the ILC text] defines the only object and purpose for which countermeasures can legitimately be imposed: i.e., to induce the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act to comply with its obligations. That is not incompatible, in our view, with the notion of countermeasures within the WTO dispute settlement system, where such measures are imposed as a temporary response to an absence of compliance.
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In Canada-Aircraft II, the arbitrators, relying on the arbitral decisions in Brazil-Aircraft and in US-FSC, stated that one of the recognized purposes of countermeasures is to induce the defaulting party to comply with the DSB's R&R. 92 of countermeasures as defined in the ILC's Articles. 93 They continued:
We therefore find that the term "countermeasures" essentially characterizes the nature of the measures to be authorized, i.e. temporary measures that would otherwise be contrary to obligations under the WTO Agreement and that are taken in response to a breach of an obligation under the SCM Agreement. This is also consistent with the meaning of this term in public international law as reflected in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 94 Consequently, the arbitrators have consistently stated that the purpose of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement is to induce the implementation of R&R in the form of withdrawal of the prohibited or actionable subsidies. Moreover, it should be noted that the arbitrators considered that countermeasures under the SCM Agreement corresponded to countermeasures in general international law.
The Standard of Appropriateness or Commensurateness
As to the standard of appropriateness under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, the arbitrators in Brazil-Aircraft found that, because the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement, there is no obligation that countermeasures be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. 95 They noted:
Requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the principle of effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.
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The arbitrators in US-FSC indicated that the standard of appropriateness involved "an element of flexibility." 97 Accordingly, 'appropriateness' does not require 'equivalence.' Rather, the required relationship is that of 'proportion.' 98 They noted that the notion of appropriateness entails an avoidance of disproportion between the proposed countermeasures and either the actual violating measure itself, the effects thereof, or both. 99 Moreover, they found that, in determining the appropriateness of a countermeasure, "the gravity of the breach and the nature of the upset in the balance of rights and obligations in question" may be taken into account.
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The flexibility of the standard of appropriateness was also noted in the arbitral decision in US-Cotton. The arbitrators stated:
The question is what countermeasures will be "appropriate" for that complainant in the specific dispute at hand. This implies that it is appropriate to take into account not only the existence of the violation in itself, but also the specific circumstances that arise from the breach for the complaining party seeking to apply countermeasures. This is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term "appropriate", which implies a degree of variability in the level of countermeasures according to the circumstances, rather than a fixed quantum.
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The arbitrators also found it legitimate to give consideration to the prohibited nature of the subsidy. They recognized that an assessment of whether proposed countermeasures are appropriate could take into account a variety of factors other than the trade impact of the subsidy.
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With regard to the standard of commensurateness, the arbitrators in US-Cotton found that the term 'commensurate' did not suggest that exact equality was required between the countermeasures and the degree and nature of the adverse effects under Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement. They noted that the term 'commensurate' connotes a less precise degree of equivalence than exact numerical correspondence. 103 Accordingly, the arbitrators have characterized the standard of appropriateness or commensurateness under the SCM Agreement as more flexible than the equivalence requirement under DSU. It is also important that not only 'quantitative,' but also 'qualitative' factors such as the "gravity of breach" can be taken into consideration for determining the appropriateness of the countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. 104 In this respect, the countermeasures under the SCM Agreement resemble those in general international law, which "must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question."
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The WTO retaliation is a special regime which is different from countermeasures under general international law. In this sense, the commentary to the ILC's Articles mentioned the WTO law as an example of lex specialis. 106 Nevertheless, the arbitrators have repeatedly referred to the ILC's Articles in respect of countermeasures in general international law and recognized their relevance in relation to countermeasures in the SCM Agreement. In this sense, general rules of State responsibility have a de facto impact on the WTO system of retaliation.
IV. Conclusion
The implementation system of the WTO DSB's R&R is a unique and relatively effective mechanism, in comparison with other second-order compliance regimes in general international law. Retaliation is one of the features of the R&R implementation system. Retaliation in the form of the suspension of concessions under DSU and countermeasures under the SCM Agreement have a common purpose, namely, inducing compliance with R&R. However, there are differences between the two. On the one hand, arbitrators have suggested that suspension of concessions under DSU might have purposes other than inducing compliance and that the equivalence requirement was rigid. On the other hand, they were clear on the point that the purpose of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement was inducing compliance and that the standard of appropriateness or commensurateness was more flexible than the equivalence requirement for retaliation under DSU. Thus, it can be said that the legal nature of retaliatory suspension of concessions under DSU is different from that of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement, and that the latter, in particular, are akin to countermeasures in general international law. In terms of the nature of the WTO retaliation, there are two different views.
On the one hand, some commentators argue that the aim of the WTO retaliation is to rebalance the tariff concessions and other obligations which the WTO members have agreed to the 'rebalancing' view. 108 According to this viewpoint, if one member breached its WTO obligations and thereby nullified or impaired benefits, the other member can also breach its WTO obligations in order to restore the original balance of benefit. On the other hand, some commentators insist that the objective of the WTO retaliation is to induce a violating member to comply with its obligations under the covered agreements (hereinafter the inducing compliance view).
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Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve the debate between them, it is important to distinguish these two types of the WTO retaliation measures, which have different legal natures. Whereas retaliation in the form of the suspension of concessions under DSU may be taken to rebalance the tariff concessions, it has been stressed that the purpose of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement was inducing compliance. This difference should be taken into consideration in debating the nature of the WTO retaliation.
